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Abstract 
We investigate the influence of the dual board structure on the financial performance of Islamic 
banks. The paper also  investigates the unique agency relationships using a sample of 90 Islamic 
banks across 13 countries over the period 2006-2014. We find that the larger the Shari’ah 
Supervisory Board (SSB) the better the financial performance and this result reinforces the 
fundamental role of the SSB to certify permissible financial instruments and products. We also 
find evidence of the scope of operation hypothesis with respect to both the board of directors and 
the SSB as Islamic banks are characterised by a higher degree of complex operations. 
Interestingly, we find that a larger SSB size may result in lower agency costs and that the greater 
the size of the unrestricted contracts, the higher the agency costs. This implies that unrestricted 
profit-sharing contracts are one of the main sources of the unique agency relationships in Islamic 
banks. The paper has a number of policy implications for regulators including the design of 
governance mechanisms in Islamic banks and the dynamics of unrestricted contracts. 
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Corporate Governance in Islamic Banks: New Insights for Dual 
Board Structure and Agency Relationships   
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Islamic banking has grown phenomenally since the 1970s  when the Dubai Islamic Bank was 
first founded, followed by Kuwait Finance House, the Faisal Islamic Bank in Egypt, and the Al-
Baraka Bank (El-Gamal, 2007 and Farag, 2016). Since then there is a remarkable growth in the 
size of Islamic Finance industry, for instance ,the total assets of Islamic banking industry 
increased from USD 1.4 trillion in 2014 to USD 1.5 trillion in 2015 with outstanding balance of 
Sukuk (Islamic bonds) of  USD 318.5 billion (IFSB- Stability Report, 2015).  
 
The economic and financial principles underlying Islamic law (Shari’ah) have a direct impact 
upon Islamic banking industry e.g. the absolute prohibition of the payment or receipt of interest, 
the banning of speculative trading activities and the concept of profit- and loss- sharing (Lewis, 
2005). The prohibition of interest and gambling protected Islamic banks from being affected by 
the recent financial crisis caused mainly by inappropriate sub-prime mortgages and speculative 
transactions in derivatives (Chazi and Syed, 2010; Smolo and Mirakhor, 2010; and Ahmed, 
2010). The investments contracts offered by Islamic banks should also be compliant with 
Shari’ah law. These contracts are mainly designed based on the concepts of equity participation, 
proﬁt-sharing (Mudaraba), and proﬁt- and loss-sharing (Musharaka) (Farag, 2016). Investment 
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account holders (IAHs), therefore, are the main providers of funds to Islamic banks (Safieddine, 
2009). 
 
While depositors usually do not share risk in conventional banks, IAHs share profit and loss with 
Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) (Musharaka contracts) (Archer et al., 1998 and Farag, 2016).  
The riskiest type of Islamic contracts is known as Mudaraba contracts which come in two 
different forms, namely restricted and unrestricted contracts (Archer et al., 1998 and Karim, 
2001). Unrestricted contracts allow bank management to make investment decisions at their 
discretion and are usually recorded in the Islamic banks’ liabilities1(Farag, 2016). However, 
restricted contracts usually allow IAHs to have a say in how banks use the capital provided by 
them and are usually recorded as off balance sheet accounts (Archer et al., 1998 and Karim, 
2001). In both contracts, IAHs have no right to interfere in fund management and more 
importantly, IAHs are liable to financial losses (Safieddine, 2009 and Farag, 2016).  
 
The governance mechanism of Islamic banks is different from that of conventional banks due to 
the natute and characteristics of Islamic banking industry. As the result, we argue that Islamic 
banks have unique agency relationships. The conventional agency problems arising from the 
likelihood of management diverting from their duty to maximise shareholders’ wealth are 
compounded by a separation between depositors’ and investors’ control rights (Safieddine, 
2009).  As Islamic banks’ returns are based on profit sharing (Mudaraba) or  profit-loss sharing 
(Musharaka) contracts,  IAHs’ returns depend on how well a bank performs financially which is 
largely dictated by management actions and behaviour (Safieddine, 2009 and Farag, 2016). 
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Consequently this complex multiple principal – agent problem arises where an IAH as a 
principal, entrusts their investment to an agent, the Islamic bank’s management who are 
appointed by another principal, the shareholder (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006a and Farag, 2016). 
Safieddine (2009) points out that the agency relationships in Islamic banks are more complex 
than those faced by conventional banks.  
 
The Shari’ah governance system in Islamic banks is defined as ‘the structures and processes 
adopted by stakeholders in an institution offering Islamic Financial Services to ensure 
compliance with Shari’ah rules and principles’ (IFSB No.10, 2009).2 Moreover, a fundamental 
feature of Shari’ah governance in Islamic banks is the presence of the Shari’ah Supervisory 
Board (SSB) which plays a principal role in reassuring stakeholders about the bank’s compliance 
with the Islamic law (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006b). Therefore, we argue that Islamic banks have a 
unique dual board structure.  
 
The main objectives of this study are threefold; firstly, we investigate the influence of board 
structure on Islamic banks’ financial performance using a hand collected data set of 90 Islamic 
banks from 13 countries over the period 2006-2014. Secondly, we investigate the main 
determinants of  board structure and the interrelationships between the board of directors and the 
SSB. Finally, we empirically investigate the agency relationships in Islamic banks.  
 
We find that the greater the SSB size the better the financial performance of Islamic banks. This 
result reinforces the fundamental role of the SSB in certifying new financial products with 
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respect to Shari’ah compliance e.g. Islamic micro-finance and Islamic financial derivatives. 
Therefore, larger SSBs may enable Islamic banks to efficiently satisfy the growing demands for 
Islamic banking industry worldwide. Moreover, we find evidence of the scope of operation 
hypothesis with respect to the board of directors and the SSB as we find that the greater the 
banks’ size and the older they are, the larger the boards of directors and SSBs’ size. This 
suggests the degree of complexity in Islamic banks’ operations. Furthermore, we find evidence 
to support the monitoring hypothesis in Islamic banks as the benefits of the increased monitoring 
exceed the monitoring cost, and thus Islamic banks tend to have larger boards of directors. 
 
Interestingly, we find a positive and significant relationship between the proportion of INEDs 
and the SSB size. We also find that a larger SSB size may result in lower agency costs in Islamic 
banks. More importantly, we find that the greater the size of the unrestricted contracts the higher 
the Islamic banks’ agency costs. This implies that Mudaraba contracts are one of the main 
sources of agency conflicts in Islamic banks.  
 
Despite numerous studies on corporate governance, our study is the first - to the best of our 
knowledge - to investigate both the unique agency relationships and the unique dual board 
structure in Islamic banks vis–à–vis their financial performance using unique hand collected 
cross-country data. We believe that the area of Islamic finance is a virgin territory in the sense 
that there is a paucity of theoretical and empirical studies explaining the rationale for the board 
demography-financial performance nexus and the impact of this relationship on the distinctive 
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agency relationships. Therefore, our paper contributes to the existing literature on corporate 
governance in IFIs.  
 
Our study is expected to offer a number of policy implications; our findings suggest that the 
regulator may reconsider the design of corporate governance mechanisms for Islamic banks and 
ensure full independence of the SSB as currently its members are appointed by the board of 
directors. Moreover, our results suggest that the regulator may also reconsider the design of the 
unrestricted contracts to mitigate agency conflicts between IAHs, shareholders and Islamic 
banks’ management.  The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief 
description of the roles of the SSB and the characteristics of the dual board structure in Islamic 
banks. Section 3 introduces the main theoretical perspectives. Section 4 reviews the literature on 
board structure and formulates the relevant hypotheses. Sections 5 and 6 describe the dataset and 
the econometric modelling respectively; whilst section 7 discusses the empirical results. Section 
8 discusses the implications of the results and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Dual Board Structure in Islamic Banks:the Shari’ah Supervisory Board 
(SSB) 
There have been extensive studies on the interrelationships between governance mechanisms and 
board structure. John and Senbet (1998) conduct a comprehensive literature survey on the 
linkage between corporate governance and board effectiveness. Highlighting the unique features 
of the relationship between boards of directors and management and the power of management 
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in directors’ selection and retention, the model designed by Warther (1998) has clear 
implications for the overall board effectiveness.   
 
Moreover, there has been an ongoing debate in the the corporate governance literature about the 
advantages and disadvantages of single-tier (unitary) boards versus the dual board structure. 
Jungmann (2006) highlights that the decision making process is much faster in single- tier boards 
as the frequency  of meetings is higher compared with the dual board structure. Moreover, all 
directors (executives and NEDs) are involved in the decision making process and have the same 
access to information and this enhances the flow of information. On the other hand, the main 
disadvantage of the unitary board structure is the non-separation between managerial and 
supervisory roles (Jungmann, 2006). However, this is the main advantage of the dual board 
structure.   
 
IFIs have a unique dual board structure; therefore, it  is necessary to understand how IFIs, in 
particular Islamic banks, are typically governed. For a start, Islamic banks operate differently 
from conventional banks. As Islamic banks cannot charge interest (riba), Shari’ah principles call 
for the design of savings accounts where the IAHs’ return is discretionary (based on the the 
bank’s overall profitability) (Safieddine, 2009). These saving accounts are thus structured based 
on the concept of equity participation, profit-sharing (Mudaraba), profit and loss sharing 
(Musharaka) and sales contracts (Murabaha)
3
 (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000).  As Shari’ah 
compliance is essential to the credibility of IFIs, it is one of the key responsibilities of the board 
of directors to establish a mechanism that enables Shari’ah scholars to apply and monitor the 
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compliance with Shari’ah (IFSB No.3, 2006); this mechanism is identified as the SSB. The main 
roles of the SSB are ex-ante  and ex-post Shari’ah monitoring. The former is concerned with the 
certification of financial instruments while the latter is concerned with transactions’ compliance 
with Shari’ah principles. Moreover, the SSB should advise on the calculation and payments of  
Zakat4 in addition to the disposal of  non- Shari’ah compliant income (Grais and Pellegrini, 
2006). 
 
The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) states that, subject to shareholders’ approval in the 
annual general meeting, boards of directors should appoint the members of the SSB. Boards of 
directors may delegate this power to the nomination committee or to the CEO. The SSB 
members are specialised jurists in Islamic jurisprudence and scholars in the field of Islamic 
finance. The IFSB states that the SSB should comprise of at least three independent non-
executive members. The IFSB also emphasises the independence and competency of the SSB 
members. Moreover it stresses the consistent application of rules and maintaining confidentiality. 
The SSB should meet regularly to carry out a periodic review of  Shari’ah compliance. Members 
of senior management in Islamic banks may attend the SSB meetings to represent the viewpoint 
of the board of directors, however they have no voting rights. Furthermore, the SSB may hold 
two joint meetings per year with the board of directors to discuss issues of common interest.  
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3. Theoretical Perspectives  
3.1 Agency Theory 
The agency conflict in the banking sector requires unique analysis. This analysis is a 
consequence of a bank board’s duty to safeguard the funds of all capital providers, including 
depositors. The role played by the regulator, the lack of transparency and the inherent risk of 
systemic failure further complicates the agency structures in banking industry. Although a subset 
of the banking sector, Islamic banks exhibit somewhat different operational and strategic 
dynamics. In particular, Islamic banks are required to operate in a Shari’ah compliant manner 
besides maximising their shareholders’ wealth (Archer, Ahmed and Al-Deehani, 1998). In 
contrast to conventional banks, IAHs share profits and losses with IFIs in Musharaka contracts. 
 
However, in Mudaraba contracts, Islamic banks share the profits but not the risks or losses with 
IAHs
5
 who are not allowed to intervene in the fund management (unrestricted Mudaraba 
contracts) (Safieddine, 2009). Therein lies the risk of opportunism from managers of Islamic 
banks to extract personal benefits at the expense of IAHs’ interests (Abdel Karim and Archer, 
2006). Therefore, in Mudaraba contracts- like shareholders- there is a separation between Islamic 
banks’ management and the cash flow rights of IAHs. However, IAHs have no power to appoint 
the board directors unlike shareholders. Equally, IAHs have no say on the appointment of the 
SSB members (Farag, 2016). Moreover, IAHs do not have monitoring and/or control rights 
(Archer et al., 1998; Karim, 2001 and Safieddine, 2009). We agree with Safieddine (2009) and 
Archer et al (1998) that Islamic banks, on the one hand, are subject to multiple agency conflicts 
between management and shareholders and on the other hand, there is a potential conflict 
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between Islamic banks’ management and IAHs. This unique agency relationships may result in a 
conflict between shareholders and IAHs (Archer et al., 1998). In this scenario, Islamic banks’ 
management is considered as a double agent (shareholders and IAHs) (Safieddine, 2009 and 
Grais and Pellegrini, 2006 and Farag, 2016). Therefore, agency conflicts may exacerbate an 
Islamic bank’s ability to attract investors.  
 
3.2 Resource Dependence Theory 
The resource dependence theory is based on the notion that board members -through advising 
and counselling roles - (Zahra and Pearce, 1989), provide experience and expertise,  facilitate 
better access to resources outside the company and influence strategic decisions (Pfeffer and 
Salancik,1978; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). An Islamic bank’s board 
size, the qualifications of its members and the presence of independent non-executive directors 
(INEDs) provide the resources that may influence the ability of a bank to comply with the basic 
requirements of governance to perform its fiduciary duties effectively.  Safieddine (2009) finds 
that independent boards are well equipped to contribute to decision making processes that 
mitigate agency conflicts. Moreover, an independent SSB that ensures the consistency of 
Shari’ah rulings forms the basis of an efficient Shari’ah governance system (Hamza, 2013). 
Therefore, Islamic banks with independent directors and those with qualified and experienced 
SSB members are expected to provide sound and independent advice and guidance in relation to 
Shari’ah compliant products. 
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3.3 Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy theory suggests that companies attempt to align their social values with the norms 
and bounds established within the society that they operate in (Deegan & Bloomquist, 2006). 
Legitimacy can be described as a resource which a business requires to operate; in this context, 
for Islamic banks to survive, they have to demonstrate and provide evidence on the compliance 
of their products with Shari’ah law. The perception of Islamic banks is enormously important to 
the Islamic community.  Where Islamic banks operate in unacceptable manner, the Islamic 
community effectively revokes the banks’ ‘licence’ to continue their operations. The SSB’s role 
is therefore to ensure compliance with the Shari’ah principles otherwise funds may be withdrawn 
and investment contracts cancelled, resulting in a fall in profits and performance of Islamic 
banks.   
 
4. Literature Review and Hypotheses Developments 
4.1 Islamic Bank Board Size and Performance 
Resource dependence theory provides the rationale that larger boards are associated with higher 
levels of financial performance (Goodstein et al, 1994; Pfeffer, 1972). On the other hand, the 
literature on non-financial companies generally finds that board size is negatively correlated with 
financial performance (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al, 1998). Thus, there is no consensus on 
the view that larger boards are associated with better performance and there might be advantages 
associated with smaller boards. For instance, Jensen (1993) suggests that beyond seven or eight 
directors, boards are less likely to function effectively. A large number of directors may 
significantly inhibit a board’s ability to take strategic actions (Goodstein et al, 1994). Judge and 
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Zeithaml (1992) find that larger boards are less likely to get involved in strategic decision 
making. Goodstein et al (1994) argue that larger boards develop coalitions and factions that may 
lead to group conflict. In sum, companies tend to determine their board size as a trade-off 
between the advisory benefits and the cost of communications. However, companies, deemed to 
be complex, perform better when their board size increases (Coles et al, 2008).  
 
The empirical findings on the influence of board size on financial performance in financial 
institutions is also mixed. Large banks are deemed organisationally complex in the sense that 
they have many subsidiaries, all of which have their own boards. Adams and Mehran (2012) find 
a positive relationship between banks’ board size and the financial performance of US bank 
holding companies (BHCs). They argue that large boards may add value when the complexity of 
BHCs increases. Andres and Vallelado (2008) use the system GMM estimator and find a positive 
but non-linear (inverted U-shaped)  relationship between board size and financial performance in 
a sample of 69 conventional banks in six countries (UK, US, Canada, France, Italy and Spain). 
This suggests that appointing an additional director beyond a particular board size results in 
lower financial performance. They conclude that board size is a trade-off between the advisory 
benefits and the cost of communications, and that a ‘one-size fits all’ board is not appropriate 
given the complexity of the banking industry. However, using a larger sample of 212 U.S. BHCs 
over a 17 year span, Pathan and Faff (2013) find a negative relationship between board size and 
the financial performance.  The above discussion reveals that the literature provides no clear 
consensus on the relationship between board size and financial performance (Daily & Schwenk, 
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1996; Johnson et al, 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Thus, we formulate our first hypothesis as 
follows: 
H1: There is an association between board size and Islamic banks’ financial 
performance. 
4.2 Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) and Bank Performance 
Agency theory dominates corporate governance where good governance is often interpreted as 
solely oriented towards value maximisation (Daily et al, 2003). A focus on value maximisation 
means orientating to agency theory’s first layer which is depicted often by a profit and self-
interest desire (Jensen, 2002). Focusing on describing what good governance looks like has 
helped obscure agency theory’s second layer; shareholders as agents of society. The second layer 
acknowledges that companies enter into contracts with a society to create positive, mutually 
beneficial relationships that if violated, can lead to harmful societal actions against the 
companies (Walsh & Seward, 1990).  
 
The SSB might be a solution to the challenge of the second layer agency theory as it engages in 
actions such as providing advice to the board on activities that best suit the objective of societal 
benefits. The SSB, through its role as guardian of Shari’ah compliance, may overrule business 
transactions which are deemed to be non-Shari’ah compliant even though such transactions are 
in the best interest of shareholders. This implies a potential conflict of interest where the board of 
directors is expected to act in the interest of shareholders, whereas the SSB’s function is to act in 
the interest of all stakeholders. To enhance the credibility of IFIs, the effectiveness of the 
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Shari’ah governance is essential, otherwise failing IFIs may potentially lead to market disruption 
and cause serious damage to the growing Islamic finance industry
6
.  
 
The literature on Shari’ah governance documents differences among IFIs on the hierarchical 
position and the structure of the SSB within the organisation (Garas and Pierce, 2010). The 
limited empirical studies on Shari’ah governance e.g. Chapra and Ahmed (2002); Maali et al, 
(2003); Grais and Pellegrini (2006b) and Hasan (2011), broadly confirm the discrepancy in 
Shari’ah governance mechanisms across countries. A qualitative cost-benefit analysis on the 
existence of the SSB is discussed in Garas and Pierce (2010) who argue that the presence of a 
SSB imposes additional costs in remunerating its members in addition to the extra legal costs 
incurred to certify the compliance with Shari’ah principles. However, they point out that the 
SSB, in approving Islamic banks’ contracts, ensures profit legitimacy and provides confidence to 
the wider stakeholders.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no published empirical study on the relationship between 
SSB size and Islamic banks’ performance. However, it could be argued that an increase in SSB 
size would be beneficial to an Islamic bank’s performance as its members have the authority to 
approve new products which bring in additional business e.g. Islamic micro-finance and financial 
derivatives. Therefore, we expect Islamic banks with a larger SSB size may have better financial 
performance. Thus, we formulate our second hypothesis as follows:  
H2: There is a positive relationship between SSB size and Islamic banks’ financial 
performance. 
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4.3 Islamic Bank Board Independence and Financial Performance 
The monitoring role is a central element of agency theory. Independent directors are perceived to 
be more effective monitors (Adams et al, 2010) and independent boards are widely believed to 
result in improved financial performance (Dalton et al, 1998). However, the literature offers 
mixed evidence on the impact of independent directors on financial performance (Yermack, 
1996; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Duchin et al, 2010). 
 
Depending on their background, INEDs- though they may lack company-specific information- 
may bring to the board different perspectives and enhance its advisory role (Coles et al, 2008). 
Likewise for banks where high information asymmetry exists, having more INEDs with 
company-specific know-how would benefit those banks, especially when they operate in risky 
and uncertain environments that have a greater need for specialised information. It is less clear to 
what extent the degree of board independence is related to bank performance. On the one hand, 
there might be an implicit cost when INEDs lack bank-specific knowledge. On the other hand, a 
larger number of INEDs may raise the monitoring level of the board and hence increase bank 
performance. 
 
Moreover, the difficulty in measuring board independence in banks has made it even less clear to 
determine the empirical relationship between board independence and financial performance
7
. 
Adams and Mehran (2012) find no relationship between the presence of independent directors 
and bank performance. However, Pathan and Skully (2010) argue that larger banks seem to have 
more independent directors when the cost of monitoring is low. Andres and Vallelado (2008) 
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find a non-linear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between the proportion of NEDs and bank 
financial performance and thus appointing additional NEDs reduces financial performance. The 
discussion so far has indicated no specific relationship that might be expected between board 
independence and bank performance. Therefore, we formulate our hypothesis as follows: 
 
 H3: Islamic banks’ performance is associated with the proportion of independent non-
executive directors. 
 
4.4 Determinants of board size 
The extant literature largely interprets the determinants of board size in the light of the scope of 
operation and monitoring hypotheses (Boone et al., 2007). The scope of operation hypothesis 
states that larger and more complex companies tend to have larger boards of directors and larger 
proportion of INEDs to mitigate agency problems (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001 and Boone et 
al., 2007). Thus the scope of operation hypothesis expects a positive and significant relationship 
between company size and board size. However due to free- riding problems, large boards might 
be less effective in the monitoring role (Boone et al., 2007). 
 
The monitoring hypothesis states that board size is determined as a trade-off between the 
incremental company-specific benefits of monitoring by appointing an additional director and 
the cost of such monitoring (Boone et al., 2007).  This suggests that when the benefits of 
increased monitoring exceed its cost, companies tend to have larger boards and the opposite is 
correct (Boone et al., 2007). In other words, the monitoring hypothesis expects that the net 
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incremental benefits of monitoring are positively related to the directors’ opportunities to 
consume private benefits; however, it is negatively related to the monitoring costs (Boone et al., 
2007). Therefore, we expect that there should be a positive relationship between board size and 
directors’ private benefits proxied by the ratio of free cash flow to total assets.  However, board 
size is expected to be negatively correlated with monitoring costs proxied by company risk and 
directors ownership (Boone et al., 2007). Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) on the other hand, 
conclude that where shareholders’ interests are aligned with those of executive directors, the 
benefits of appointing executive directors outweigh board entrenchment costs. 
 
In Islamic banks the role of the SSB is to verify - according to the Islamic law- the permitted 
financial instruments (ex-ante Shari’ah supervision) and to ensure transactions’ compliance with 
Shari’ah principles (ex-post Shari’ah monitoring).  Islamic banks’ operations require the board of 
directors to be able to monitor management efficiently and to work with the SSB to ensure that 
all transactions are deemed Shari’ah compliant. Therefore due to this large scale of operations, 
we expect that board size will be larger since a larger board brings in more members with varied 
expertise to monitor and advise managers. However, a larger board increases remuneration costs 
as well as creating problems of communication and co-ordination in decision making (Yermack, 
1996; Andres and Vallelado, 2008). The size of an Islamic bank’s board is therefore a trade-off 
between the benefits of increased monitoring and costs of such monitoring (communication, co-
ordination and control). Likewise a larger SSB facilitates better monitoring role. However, the 
cost of Shari’ah supervision increases in line with the co-ordination and control problems 
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associated with larger boards. Based on the above discussion, we formulate the following 2 
hypotheses: 
 
H4: The greater the degree of Islamic banks’ complexity the larger the board of 
directors’ and SSB size. 
H5: The size of an Islamic bank’s board is a trade-off between bank-specific benefits of 
increased monitoring and monitoring costs. 
 
5. Data and Variables Description  
To investigate the influence of board structure on financial performance and the main 
determinants of board structure in Islamic banks, we hand collect data for a sample of 90 Islamic 
banks from 13 countries namely Bahrain, Bangladesh, Indonesia
8
, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Sudan, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the UK. Our 
dataset is unbalanced panel data over the period 2006-2014 (723 bank- year observations). Data 
was collected from Bankscope, the Banker magazine, Perfect Information Navigator, and 
Companies House-UK, in addition to the annual reports and websites of the respective banks.  
Islamic banks were identified from several resources including Bankscope and the Bankers 
magazine. The latter publishes an annual survey of the top Islamic financial institutions by 
country. Following Mallin et al (2014), we restrict our sample to only Shari’ah compliant banks.  
Moreover, we exclude Islamic banks in both Iran and Turkey as they have different governance 
mechanisms. Finally, we exclude subsidiaries and Islamic banks which provide only financial 
statements.  
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We control for board size, SSB size and the proportion of INEDs to capture Islamic banks’ board 
structure. We also use the quadratic term of both board size and SSB size to capture the non-
linear board structure–performance relationship. We use a CEO/chair duality dummy as a proxy 
for CEO power and leadership structure. Fosberg and Nelson (1999) find a positive relationship 
between the change in leadership style from the unitary leadership structure to a dual leadership 
structure (CEO/chair duality) and financial performance.  
 
Moreover, we use the frequency of board meetings to capture the intensity of board activities
9
. 
Vafeas(1999) finds that the annual number of board meetings is inversely related to firm value.  
Furthermore, we control for the proportion of directors’ share ownership. Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1997) find that executive directors’ ownership is a main determinant of stock market reaction to 
the appointment of executive directors. They find a negative and significant relationship when 
executives share ownership is less than 5%. Moreover they find a positive and significant 
relationship when executives share ownership is between 5% and 25%. 
 
We use four alternative financial performance measures namely return on operating assets 
(ROOA) defined as operating profit divided by average total assets; return on assets (ROA) 
defined as net profit divided by average total assets; return on operating equity (ROOE) defined 
as operating profit divided by average total equity; return on equity (ROE) defined as net profit 
divided by average total equity
10
. We also control for banks’ Z scores (ROA plus capital to asset 
ratio divided by standard deviation of ROA) as a proxy for the distance to default risk.  
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We use a set of control variables to capture the differences in Islamic banking financing 
activities and efficiency, namely finances/total assets and equity/total assets. Moreover, we use 
the ratio of cash flow to total assets and overhead ratio as proxies for agency costs. Daher et al 
(2015) find that shareholders are more safeguarded in private Islamic banks compared to their 
state-owned counterparts. Therefore, as a robustness test, we use a dummy variable, Private, that 
is equal to 1 for private banks and 0 otherwise. 
 
We also control for banks’ total assets in US$ and the natural logarithm of GDP in US$ as 
proxies for size and macroeconomic indicators respectively; in addition we control for country 
heterogeneity by using country dummies.  To control for the differences in regulatory, legal and 
cultural
11
 environments in Islamic banks, we use The Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, 
carried out by the World Bank and formulated in 2003, 2007, and 2012 following the study of 
Farag and Mallin (2017). The survey includes data on banking regulations and supervision from 
143 jurisdictions around the world
12
. Therefore, we control for disclosure and enforcement 
indices for our sample countries as the sum of 32 and 20 Yes/No questions (dummies) on 
disclosure and enforcement respectively.
13
  
 
6. Econometric Modelling  
To empirically investigate our research questions, we use a panel data model to control for 
unobservable effects, which cannot be detected through both pure time series and cross-section 
analyses. Therefore, it mitigates endogeneity that may bias the results and lead to spurious 
correlations due to the omitted unobservable company characteristics (Adams and Ferreira 
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2009). Dalton et al, (1999) indicate that longitudinal studies may establish the direction of 
causality for board size-financial performance links. Therefore, we use a fixed effects model to 
control for country heterogeneity and any other unobservable company characteristics that may 
influence the results. 
  
As a robustness check and to overcome the other  sources of endogeneity e.g. reverse causality, 
we estimate the Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) 
estimator which combines in a system the equation in first-differences with the same equation 
expressed in levels. The choice of instrumental variables is essential for a consistent estimation. 
Brown et al (2011) state that “instrumental values are likely to be ambiguous, unless there is 
better theory, the effectiveness of the IVs approach is likely to remain contentious’. One of the 
advantages of using the system GMM that it allows the use of internal instruments.  
Therefore, we use, following Andres and Vallelado, (2008) and Boone et al.(2007), lagged board 
size, lagged SSB size and lagged percentage of INEDs with different lag-lengths (3-5) as 
instruments to control for the endogeneity problem. Lagged levels are used as instruments for the 
regression in differences, and lags of the first-differenced variables are used as instruments in the 
equation in levels. We use the adjustment for small samples introduced by Windmeijer (2000) to 
improve the robustness of our results and to avoid any potential bias in the estimated asymptotic 
standard error. To test for the over-identifying restrictions, we report the Hansen test. Moreover 
we calculate the Arellano and Bond test for first- and second-order autocorrelation with a null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation. 
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We agree with Daily and Schwenk (1996); Johnson et al (1996);  Zahra and Pearce (1989) that 
how board demography influences financial performance may not be direct and simple. Dalton et 
al, (1999) argue that finer-grained examinations may provide more guidance on the dynamics of 
the relationship. Therefore, as a robustness check, we estimate the 2SLS following the study of 
Cumming et al (2015) to further investigate whether board structure and financial performance 
are endogenously determined. In the first stage we estimate the main determinants of board size, 
SSB size and the proportion of INEDs –as suspect endogenous variables- using their lagged 
variables as instruments. Given the stickiness of the governance variables we used 3 and 4 lags 
as instruments. In the second stage we estimate the relationship between board size, SSB size 
and the proportion of INEDs and financial performance controlling for the fitted variables of the 
suspect endogenous variables. For more details, please see Cumming et al (2015).   
 
7. Empirical Results 
The descriptive statistics for the pooled sample are presented in Table 1. The sample size is 90 
Islamic banks and 723 bank-year observations over the period 2006-2014. The average return on 
operating assets (ROOA) and return on assets (ROA) are 0.848% and 0.64% respectively.  The 
average return on operating equity (ROOE) and return on equity (ROE) are 10.39% and 7.96% 
respectively.  The board of directors’ size ranges from 3 to 23 directors with an average of 8.87 
directors whereas the average SSB size ranges from 2 to 14 members with an average of 4.23 
members. Table 1 also shows that the average proportion of INEDs is 36.3% while the chair and 
CEO roles are split in 65% of the sample period. Not surprisingly, the average proportion of 
female directors on the board of directors is 1.5%.  
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The results also show that the average ratios of finances to total assets and equity to total assets 
are 50.89% and 24.86% respectively. Moreover, the average ratios of cash to total assets and 
overhead to total assets as proxies for agency costs are 10.65% and 3.18% respectively. Finally, 
the average bank age is 13.38 years old. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the pooled 
sample by country. 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for the main variables used in the empirical analysis. It is 
clear from Table 3 that there is no evidence of a multicollinearity problem. We do not control for 
both Log restricted & unrestricted Mudaraba contracts in the same regression (See Table 9). 
Moreover, we calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF) for all regression models and find that 
the VIF is significantly less than 10.   
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the influence of board structure on financial 
performance in Islamic banks. The results show that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between board size and financial performance. However, in Models 3 and 4 this 
relationship is highly significant at the 1% level.  The results presented in Models 3 and 4 imply 
that – holding other variables constant- a 1 % change in board size may lead to a change of 
0.27% and 0.23% in financial performance measured by ROOE and ROE respectively. 
Moreover, we find a positive but insignificant relationship between the proportion of INEDs and 
financial performance in Models 1-4 
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Insert Table 4 about here 
Similarly but more interestingly, we find a positive and significant relationship between SSB size 
and financial performance in the four Models. This suggests that the greater the SSB size the 
better the financial performance of Islamic banks and that– holding other variables constant- a    
1% change in the SSB size may lead to a change of 0.024% % and 0.025% in financial 
performance measured by ROOA and ROA respectively. Moreover, the results also show that a 
1 % change in SSB size may lead to a change of 0.133% and 0.145% in financial performance 
measured by ROOE and ROE respectively.  This result may shed the light on the fundamental 
role played by the SSB to approve Islamic banks’ operations and to legitimise new products 
which bring in additional profit e.g. Islamic micro-finance and Islamic financial derivatives. The 
above results might be driven by the endogeneity and reverse causality between board structure 
and financial performance. In the following sections we mitigate endogeneity concerns using 
both system GMM and 2SLS.  
 
The results also show that the coefficients on the Z scores are positive; however they are 
significant at the level of 5% in Models 3 and 4. This suggests that the higher the distance to 
default the higher the financial performance measured by ROOE and ROE. However, the 
coefficients on the ratio of overheads to total assets as a proxy for agency costs are negative and 
highly significant (p<1%). This suggests that the higher the agency costs the lower the financial 
performance of Islamic banks. We also find – as expected- a positive and significant relationship 
at the 1% level between both finances/total assets and equity/total assets and financial 
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performance as proxies for Islamic banks’ financing activities and efficiency. The models 
presented in Table 4 are well-specified as F-statistics are highly significant.  
 
The results presented in Table 4 imply that there is a positive and significant relationship 
between both board size and the SSB size and financial performance. We argue that this 
relationship might be non-linear and that appointing an additional director /member to the board 
of directors and/or the SSB size may influence financial performance. To this end, Table 5 
presents the regression results of the influence of the non-linear relationship between board 
structure and financial performance in Islamic banks. 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
In Table 5, we control for the squared coefficients on board size and SSB size as in Models 1-4. 
We find that the coefficient on the squared board size is statistically insignificant suggesting that 
there is no influence of appointing an extra director on the financial performance of Islamic 
banks. However interestingly, we find that the relationship between the SSB size and financial 
performance is non-linear and has an inverted U shape. This suggests that the greater the size of 
the SSB the better the financial performance up to a point (7-8 SSB members) after which 
appointing an additional SSB member results in lower financial performance.  
 
Table 1 reports that the average size of the board of directors is rather higher (8.8) than the 
average size of the SSB (4.2) within our sample. This implies that there might be a need to 
increase the SSB size in order to deal more efficiently with the increasing demands in Islamic 
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banking operations. Islamic banks in some emerging markets e.g. Saudi Arabia, UAE, and 
Indonesia are due to adopt new financial instruments and products such as Islamic micro-finance 
and Islamic financial derivatives as the result of market expansion. Such banks might therefore 
need more SSB members to review the compliance of these financial instruments with Shari’ah 
principles.  
 
Daily and Schwenk, 1996; Johnson et al., 1996;  and Zahra and Pearce, 1989 argue that the board 
structure-financial performance nexus might not be direct and simple but driven by other 
variables and that finer-grained examinations may provide more guidance on the dynamics of 
this relationship to establish the direction of causality between board size and financial 
performance. To this end, we address the endogeneity concerns between board structure and 
financial performance; Table 6 reports the results of the system GMM estimator for the influence 
of board structure on the financial performance of Islamic banks. It is clear that the results of the 
dynamic model reject the null hypothesis that the lagged financial performance coefficients are 
zero.  
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
The results presented in Table 6 are by and large consistent with those presented in Table 4. We 
find a positive and significant relationship between board of directors’ size and financial 
performance. This result is consistent with Andres and Vallelado (2008) as they argue that banks 
with bigger boards may have a better allocation of resources to advise and monitor senior 
management. Most importantly, it allows more time for strategic decisions. The above result 
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cannot reject our first hypothesis. Importantly, we find a positive and significant relationship 
between SSB size and financial performance. We argue that the greater the SSB size the greater 
the efficiency in time and resources allocation within the complexity of banking regulations 
across different countries (La Porta et al., 2002) and this suggests the essential role played by the 
SSB. The above result cannot reject our second hypothesis. 
 
Again, consistent with the results presented in Table 4, we find no significant relationship 
between the proportion of INEDs and financial performance; this result does not support our 
third hypothesis. The literature on corporate governance reports contradictory findings on the 
relationship between INEDs and the overall performance (see for example, Bhagat and Black, 
(2002), Hermalin and Weisbach, (1991) and John and Senbet (1998). Islamic banks are complex 
organisations where high information asymmetry exists in unstable and uncertain environments 
that have a greater need for specialised information. Therefore, INEDs who lack bank-specific 
information can hardly contribute to banks’ financial performance (Coles et al, 2008).  
 
Table 6 also reports consistent results with those presented in Table 4 with respect to the 
relationship between overheads ratio, finance/total assets, equity/total assets and financial 
performance. The system GMM models are well specified as the tests regarding serial correlation 
do not reject the absence of second order serial correlation, and the Hansen test results do not 
reject the over-identifying restrictions.  
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To further investigate whether board structure and financial performance are endogenously 
determined, Table 7 presents the estimation results of the instrumental variables regressions 
using the 2SLS.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
As expected, the instrument (3 lags of SSB size) is highly significant in the first stage regression. 
In the second stage, we find a positive and highly significant (p< 1%) relationship between the 
fitted value of SSB size and financial performance measured by both ROOA and ROA. This 
result is consistent with those presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6 and suggests that the larger the SSB 
size, the better the financial performance of Islamic banks. We also estimate the 2SLS regression 
– not reported- to address the endogeneity concerns between both board size and independence 
and financial performance separately. Again in the first stage, the instruments used (3 lags of 
board size or INEDs) are highly significant. However, the predicted values of the instruments are 
statistically insignificant in the second stage. This suggests that board size/independence and 
financial performance relationship might be endogenously determined. The Hausman test result 
fails to reject the null that the variables are exogenous. Moreover, our instruments passed the 
Stock and Yogo (2005) test for weak instruments.  
 
Table 8 presents the main determinants of board of directors’ size and SSB size as in Panels A 
and B respectively. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
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In Panels A and B, we control for bank size and age - as proxies for the scope of operation 
hypothesis. Boone et al (2003) argue that controlling for more than one proxy in the same 
regression model may bias the coefficients due to the interrelationships between the proxies of 
the scope of operation hypothesis (i.e. bank age and size). Therefore, we present the results of the 
scope of operation hypothesis using bank size, bank age and both bank size and age in Models 1, 
2 and 3 respectively for board size and in Models 4, 5 and 6 respectively for the SSB size. We 
also include the lagged proportion of INEDs as an instrumental variable to control for 
endogeneity as in Models 1-6 following Boone et al (2007). 
Panel A shows consistent results with the scope of operation hypothesis as we find a positive and 
highly significant (p<1%) relationship between both banks size and age and board of directors’ 
size as presented in Models 1 and 2 respectively. Moreover, we find similar results when we 
control for the two proxies in Model 3. This suggests that the greater the bank size and age the 
bigger the board of directors’ size in Islamic banks due to their higher degree of complex 
operations. 
Interestingly in Panel B, we find evidence of the scope of operation hypothesis with respect to 
the SSB as we find a positive and highly significant (p<1%) relationship between Islamic banks’ 
size and age and SSB size as presented in Models 4, 5 and 6 respectively. This suggests that the 
larger the Islamic banks’ size and the older they are, the larger the SSB size. The above results 
cannot reject our fourth hypothesis for both board of directors and SSB. 
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Table 8 also reports a positive and highly significant (p<1%) relationship between cash flow 
ratio as a proxy for directors’ private benefits and board of directors’ size as in Panel A. This 
result supports the monitoring hypothesis in Islamic banks suggesting that the greater the 
directors’ private benefits the larger the board size. However, we find no significant relationship 
between monitoring costs (proxied by Z score and directors’ ownership) and board size. Looking 
at the coefficients on the cash flow ratio, Z score and directors’ ownership, the results presented 
in Panel A suggest that directors’ private benefits exceed monitoring costs in Islamic banks and 
thus Islamic banks tend to have larger boards. Therefore, the above results cannot reject the fifth 
hypothesis with respect to the board of directors. We also find consistent results with Mak and Li 
(2001) as we find a negative and significant relationship between the proportion of independent 
directors and board size.  
 
On the other hand in Panel B, we find a negative and significant relationship at the 5% level 
between cash flow ratio and SSB size as in Models 4-6. This suggests that the greater the 
directors’ private benefits the smaller the SSB size. We argue that directors may exercise their 
power to reduce the SSB size. With respect to the monitoring costs, we find - as expected- a 
negative and significant relationship between directors’ ownership as a proxy for monitoring 
costs and the SSB size as in Models 4-6. This suggests that the greater the monitoring costs the 
smaller the SSB size. Again, the coefficients on directors’ private benefits exceed those of 
monitoring costs and thus Islamic banks tend to have larger SSB. 
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Interestingly in Panel B, we find that the greater the board of directors’ independence the greater 
the SSB size. This result is consistent with our argument on the influence of the executive 
directors on the size of the SSB. Finally, the models are well specified as the F. statistics is 
highly significant (p<1%) for all models. As a robustness check, we also estimate the 
determinants of board size and SSB size using the system GMM estimator and find consistent 
results with those presented in Table8. 
 
In this section, we investigate the unique agency relationships in Islamic banks. Table 9 presents 
the fixed effects and system GMM estimation results as in Panels A and B respectively. 
 
Insert Table 9 about here 
 
 
We find a negative relationship between the SSB size and agency costs proxied by the ratio of 
cash flow to total assets in Panels A and B. However, this relationship is significant at the 5% 
level in Panel A.  This suggests that the larger the SSB size, the lower the agency cost in Islamic 
banks. Moreover, we find – as expected- a negative relationship between directors’ remuneration 
and agency cost. However, this relationship is highly significant (p<1%) in Panel A. This 
highlights the importance of compensation schemes in mitigating agency conflicts in Islamic 
banks. Interestingly, we find a positive and significant relationship between both unrestricted 
Mudaraba contracts and total restricted and unrestricted Mudaraba contracts and agency cost as 
in Panels A and B
14
. This suggests that the greater the size of Mudaraba contracts the higher the 
Islamic banks’ agency cost. This also implies that Mudaraba contracts, as the riskiest type of 
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contracts, are one of the main sources of agency conflicts in Islamic banks. Due to the design of 
such contracts, Islamic banks are allowed to make investment decisions that best suits the 
financial goals of both IAHs and the bank at their discretion. These contracts are neither 
obligations nor equity instruments; however, they are profit-sharing financial instruments 
(Archer et al., 1998 and Karim, 2001). As a result, Mudaraba contracts may create a unique type 
of agency conflict between IAHs and Islamic banks’ management.  
 
8. Summary, Conclusion and Discussion 
Islamic banking is growing in prominence within the global banking industry. However, Islamic 
banks are different from conventional ones as Islamic law prohibits the payment or receipt of 
interest and does not allow investment in some industries e.g tobacco, alcohol and other types of 
financial instruments e.g. derivatives and conventional bonds. These constraints may decouple 
Islamic banks from its conventional counterparts and may lead to lower portfolio performance 
(Basov and Bhatti, 2014). On the other hand, Ajmi et al (2014) reject the claim of decoupling the 
Islamic finance market from its conventional counterparts. They argue that the integration 
between Islamic finance and conventional international financial markets may lead to greater 
benefits of diversification. 
 
The continued growth in the Islamic finance industry reflects the importance of the governance 
of Islamic banks and the roles played by both the board of directors and the SSB. The board of 
directors plays a central oversight role in governance and the literature has been seeking to better 
understand how board structure influences performance. The objectives of this paper are 
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threefold; firstly, we investigate the relationship between Islamic banks’ board structure and 
financial performance. Secondly, we investigate the main determinants of the dual board 
structure and the interrelationship between the board of directors and the SSB. Finally, we 
investigate the unique agency relationships and the role of restricted and unrestricted contracts. 
Using a cross-country sample of 90 Islamic banks over the period 2006-2014, we find that the 
greater the SSB size the better the financial performance of Islamic banks. This result reinforces 
the fundamental role of the SSB in certifying new financial products with respect to Shari’ah 
compliance e.g. Islamic micro-finance and Islamic financial derivatives. Therefore, Islamic 
banks and the regulators may reconsider the size of the SSB such that it meets the growing 
demands on the Islamic banking industry.  
 
Moreover, we find evidence of the scope of operation hypothesis for the board of directors and 
the SSB as we find a positive and significant relationship between banks’ size and age and both 
board of directors’ size and the SSB size. Islamic banks are characterised by a higher degree of 
complex operations suggesting that the greater the bank size and the older they are, the larger the 
board of directors and the SSB size. Furthermore, we find evidence to support the monitoring 
hypothesis in Islamic banks as directors’ private benefits are found to exceed monitoring costs 
and thus Islamic banks tend to have larger boards of directors. On the other hand, we find a 
negative and significant relationship between directors’ private benefits and the SSB size. 
Interestingly, we find that the greater the board of directors’ independence the greater the SSB 
size. We argue that SSB size might be influenced by the power of the directors on the board of 
directors.  
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We claim that Islamic banks have unique agency relationships due to the nature of some 
financial instruments e.g. unrestricted Mudaraba contracts. We find that larger SSB size may 
result in lower agency costs. Interestingly, we find that the greater the size of Mudaraba contracts 
the higher the Islamic banks’ agency costs. This implies that Mudaraba contracts, as the riskiest 
type of contracts, are one of the main sources of agency conflicts in Islamic banks.  Unrestricted 
Mudaraba contracts enable Islamic banks’ management to make discretionary investment 
decisions in any type of business or project that best suits the financial goals of IAHs and the 
banks. These contracts are neither obligations nor equity instruments; however, they are profit-
sharing financial instruments (Archer et al., 1998 and Karim, 2001). Therefore, Mudaraba 
contracts may create another type of unique agency conflict between IAHs and Islamic banks’ 
management.  
 
Our study has a number of policy implications; firstly, our message to the regulators is to 
increase the size of the SSB by appointing qualified scholars to mitigate agency relationships.  A 
larger SSB on the other hand, brings in the relevant resources to review the Shari’ah compliance 
of new Islamic financial instruments e.g. Islamic micro-finance due to the expansion of the 
Islamic finance business model worldwide. Therefore Islamic banking regulators may encourage 
and support the establishment of professional institutions dedicated to training scholars to 
identify, understand and verify the authenticity of Shari’ah compliant financial products, 
especially innovative instruments, and thereby to help ensure confidence in Islamic banks and 
their corporate governance.  
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We also argue that regulators may reconsider the design of corporate governance mechanisms 
for Islamic banks to ensure full independence for the SSB as currently they are appointed by the 
board of directors. Moreover, regulators could ensure that SSBs might have a mandatory rather 
than a consultative mandate in some countries. Finally, while Mudaraba contracts represent a 
claim on the Islamic banks’ earnings or assets due to the concept of profit sharing, there is 
however a separation between IAHs and bank management. IAHs on the other hand, are not 
granted monitoring and/or control rights (Archer et al., 1998; Karim, 2001 and Safieddine, 
2009). Therefore, regulators are also encouraged to reconsider the design of  the unrestricted 
contracts to mitigate agency conflicts between IAHs and both management and shareholders. 
Regulators may also cosider an appropriate representation of IAHs in the governance mechanism 
of Islamic banks. 
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Endnotes  
                                                             
1
 In unrestricted Mudaraba contracts, Islamic banks’ management have more opportunities to act in their best 
interest (Safieddine, 2009). 
2 The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), founded in 2002, provides guidance on the key regulatory issues 
pertaining to Islamic financial institutions.Its pronouncements complement those of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision. 
3 A Murabaha is a sale on a cost-plus basis where payment of the price (including the mark-up) is deferred to a later 
date. A Musharaka contract means profits and losses are shared in a mutually agreed upon proportion between the 
investors and the bank.  
4 Zakat is a religious tax deducted from the wealthy to be paid to the needy. 
5
 Unless it is the result of a proven misconduct or negligence by IFIs (Safieddine, 2009). 
6 The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) issued three Shari’ah 
related Governance Standards to strengthen the role of the SSB and streamline its functions. Equally, the IFSB 
issued two governance related Guidelines to assist IFIs in adopting Shari’ah assurance processes. Both the AAOIFI 
and the IFSB emphasise the need for a good and effective Shari’ah governance system as an integral part of the 
corporate governance in IFIs.  
7 For example, in the U.S., directors may act for some of the bank’s best customers (as reported in Adams and 
Mehran, 2008 citing Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 2002). Customer directors may not be truly independent 
because they are likely to have different objectives than do other non-executive directors. In some countries such as 
Malaysia, governments may appoint representatives to sit on large commercial bank boards. These government 
linked directors may also not be considered truly independent. 
8 In addition to the SSB, Indonesia has a dual board structure that comprises of a board of commissioners and a 
board of directors. 
9 Due to the unique qualifications of the SSB members, they are expected to sit on multiple boards (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Hambrick and Mason,1984). Therefore as a robustness test, we control for the percentage of SSB 
members with multiple directorships. We also use the percentage of board of directors cross membership; however, 
we obtained insignificant results. 
10 Our sample consists of both listed and private banks; therefore, we are unable to use Tobin’s Q ratio as a measure 
of performance. 
11 We also use the Hofstede index to control for cultural differences across countries, however, the dimension scores 
are equal for six Arab countries from our sample.  Moreover, date on Syria, Sudan and Qatar is not found in the 
survey. Therefore, using the Hofstede index in this case may not reflect the variation across cultural dimensions of 
our sample countries. Nevertheless, we estimate the regression of the influence of board structure on financial 
performance controlling for individual cultural dimensions of Hofstede separately and in particular Long/Short-term 
Orientation and obtained similar results.  
12 The survey does not include data on Saudi Arabia and Sudan  
13 For more details please see  
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20345037~pagePK:64214825~piPK
:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html#Original_Database_by_country__40kb_each_ 
14 We also find similar results when using restricted Mudaraba contracts. 
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 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Pooled Sample 
 Mean Median SD Min Max Obs 
ROOA (%) 0.848 1.295 6.388 -59.45 33.13 722 
ROA (%) 0.642 1.03 6.366 -45.12 31.13 722 
ROOE (%) 10.391 10.06 18.252 -93.37 81.27 720 
ROE (%) 7.962 8.97 15.844 -93.37 63.15 720 
Female 0.015 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.286 723 
INEDs 0.363 0.400 0.242 0.000 0.943 723 
Bsize  8.877 9.000 2.913 3.000 23.000 723 
SSBsize 4.227 4.000 1.827 2.000 14.000 723 
CEO/chair 0.649 1.000 0.478 0.000 1.000 723 
Dirown (%) 1.845 0.000 7.166 0.000 52.76 723 
# meetings 8.109 6.000 5.897 3.000 24.000 723 
Bankage 13.380 9.000 11.535 1.000 61.00 723 
TA(mil $) 5441.563 1469.425 10939.82 0.636 83082.13 723 
Cash/TA (%) 10.653 7.014 10.806 0.001 80.468 717 
Overhead ratio (%) 3.178 2.128 3.761 0.153 60.811 721 
Finances/TA (%) 50.892 56.946 22.396 0.401 98.919 659 
Equity/TA (%) 24.857 13.25 28.448 -97.27 99.82 723 
LogZscores 3.029 3.182 1.157 -1.123 5.671 722 
Unrestricted investment(mil $) 2970.92 2970.91 9042.54 0.002 193373.5 638 
Restricted investment (mil $) 214.36 214.36 378.08 0.021 3132.41 145 
LogGDP 21.698 24.245 6.637 10.178 28.726 710 
Disclosure Index 23.834 25.000 2.113 18.000 25.000 723 
Enforcement Index 15.616 17.000 2.680 7.000 18.000 723 
ROOA: return on operating assets defined as operating profit divided by average total assets; ROA: return on 
assets defined as net profit divided by average total assets; ROOE: return on operating equity defined as operating 
profit divided by average total equity; ROE: return on equity defined as net profit divided by average total equity; 
Female: proportion of female directors on board of directors; INEDs: proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on board of directors; Bsize: total number of directors on the board of directors; SSBsize: total number 
of directors on the Shari’ah Supervisory board;  CEO/Chair: dummy variable takes the value of 1 where the roles 
of the CEO and Chairman is split and 0 otherwise; Dirown: percentage of shares owned by directors on the board 
of directors; # meetings: number of board of directors’ meetings;  Bankage: Bank age since its establishment 
year; TA: Total assets; Cash/TA: ratio of cash divided by total assets; Overhead ratio: ratio of overheads to total 
assets; Finances/TA: ratio of  total finances/total assets; Equity/TA: ratio of total equity to total assets; 
LogZscores: logarithm of Z scores calculated as ROA + capital to asset ratio divided by standard deviation of 
ROA; Unrestricted investment: dollar value of restricted Mudaraba contract; Restricted investment: dollar value 
of unrestricted Mudaraba contracts; LogGDP: logarithm of Gross Domestic Product; Disclosure and Enforcement 
Indexes: sum of dummy variables take the value of 1 if the answer to questions on disclosure and enforcement 
from the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, carried out by the World Bank, is yes and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Pooled Sample by Country 
 UAE Malaysia Pakistan Saudi Arabia Bahrain Qatar UK Syria Kuwait Jordan Bangladesh Indonesia Sudan 
ROOA (%) 1.158 0.678 -0.141 3.421 0.208 3.447 -5.335 0.573 0.879 1.328 1.510 1.129 2.913 
ROA (%) 1.011 0.476 -0.032 3.453 0.177 3.296 -5.643 0.365 0.733 0.962 0.393 0.790 2.642 
ROOE (%) 10.459 14.351 3.859 12.173 1.345 14.981 -14.236 5.254 4.324 15.541 35.038 15.06 21.899 
ROE (%) 8.677 10.978 2.933 12.406 1.253 14.442 -14.677 3.833 3.474 10.975 20.837 10.476 19.842 
Female 0.003 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.039 0.089 0.012 
INEDs 0.214 0.489 0.389 0.473 0.456 0.219 0.374 0.505 0.264 0.473 0.081 0.612 0.011 
Bsize 7.545 7.671 9.100 9.512 9.146 8.784 7.706 7.000 8.600 8.762 15.408 4.800 9.870 
SSBsize 4.109 4.385 3.000 4.756 3.677 3.378 3.382 3.000 4.575 3.190 8.714 2.867 4.389 
CEO/chair 0.273 0.741 0.850 0.878 0.787 0.351 0.559 0.533 0.350 0.762 1.000 1.000 0.001 
Dirown (%) 0.002 0.076 2.516 0.105 0.313 1.157 0.103 2.737 0.000 0.109 21.020 0.387 0.652 
# meetings 5.109 10.042 5.050 5.098 6.030 8.622 8.588 6.000 6.875 6.333 14.918 23.000 4.000 
Bankage 12.418 13.601 7.550 16.220 13.177 14.486 5.559 5.267 12.425 19.000 16.918 10.60 19.833 
TA (mil$) 11026.06 8530.272 761.185 17648.56 2016.724 8831.105 512.850 199.307 12270.65 2156.788 1723.908 1067 433.872 
Cash/TA (%) 7.457 19.832 8.182 8.516 4.383 4.290 5.094 25.836 6.665 19.193 8.581 3.962 20.719 
Overhead ratio (%) 2.051 1.615 3.972 2.433 4.765 1.345 8.008 1.668 2.314 1.864 2.053 3.979 4.031 
Finances/TA (%) 63.078 56.463 42.578 60.693 37.862 55.323 28.228 26.877 48.877 54.897 72.327 73.861 36.649 
Equity/TA (%) 14.073 9.943 17.159 34.616 53.491 24.897 45.126 18.791 20.647 13.523 1.131 7.851 16.109 
# Banks 7 17 5 5 20 5 4 2 5 3 6 4 7 
# Bank year obs. 55 143 40 41 164 37 34 15 40 21 49 30 54 
ROOA: return on operating assets defined as operating profit divided by average total assets; ROA: return on assets defined as net profit divided by average total assets; ROOE: return 
on operating equity defined as operating profit divided by average total equity; ROE: return on equity defined as net profit divided by average total equity; Female: proportion of 
female directors on board of directors; INEDs: proportion of independent non-executive directors on board of directors; Bsize: total number of directors on the board of directors; 
SSBsize: total number of directors on the Shari’ah Supervisory board; CEO/Chair: dummy variable takes the value of 1 where the roles of the CEO and Chairman is split and 0 
otherwise; Dirown: percentage of shares owned by directors on the board of directors; # meetings: number of board of directors’ meetings; Bankage: Bank age since its establishment 
year; TA: Total assets; Cash/TA: ratio of cash divided by total assets; Overhead ratio: ratio of overheads to total assets; Finances/TA: ratio of  total finances/total assets; Equity/TA: 
ratio of total equity to total assets. 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 ROOA (%) 1.000          
2 ROA (%) 0.989 1.000         
3 ROOE (%) 0.640 0.599 1.000        
4 ROE (%) 0.725 0.711 0.957 1.000       
5 Female 0.036 0.024 0.141 0.116 1.000      
6 INEDs -0.069 -0.054 -0.171 -0.147 0.080 1.000     
7 LogGDP -0.082 -0.056 -0.310 -0.230 -0.140 0.344 1.000    
8 LogBsize 0.132 0.109 0.278 0.233 -0.051 -0.292 -0.176 1.000   
9 LogSSBsize 0.092 0.066 0.350 0.272 0.113 -0.184 -0.230 0.480 1.000  
10 Logage 0.066 0.068 0.255 0.265 0.067 -0.147 -0.144 0.180 0.238 1.000 
11 LogTA 0.141 0.127 0.415 0.365 0.270 0.079 -0.084 0.007 0.209 0.166 
12 Cash/TA (%) 0.042 0.043 0.142 0.151 0.003 -0.036 -0.073 0.025 0.048 0.030 
13 Overhead ratio (%) -0.335 -0.319 -0.424 -0.425 -0.056 -0.025 0.035 -0.042 -0.094 -0.139 
14 Finances/TA (%) 0.223 0.202 0.327 0.273 0.187 -0.003 -0.095 -0.071 0.209 0.133 
15 Equity/TA (%) -0.020 -0.015 -0.321 -0.275 -0.187 0.073 0.234 0.010 -0.310 -0.282 
16 Dirown (%) -0.041 -0.059 0.234 0.159 0.150 -0.251 -0.314 0.166 0.247 0.062 
17 # meetings -0.003 -0.026 0.156 0.067 0.322 0.086 -0.213 -0.052 0.164 0.109 
18 Logzscores 0.181 0.149 0.354 0.334 0.211 -0.036 -0.059 -0.099 0.007 0.023 
19 Logunrestricted  0.129 0.106 0.379 0.319 0.224 -0.033 -0.108 0.041 0.225 0.189 
20 Logtotalrestandunrestricted 0.170 0.148 0.397 0.338 0.235 -0.031 -0.104 0.031 0.212 0.199 
21 Logdirrem 0.143 0.160 -0.048 0.063 -0.093 0.166 0.418 -0.010 -0.038 0.172 
 
   11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
11  LogTA 1.000           
12  Cash/TA (%) 0.066 1.000          
13  Overhead ratio (%) -0.355 -0.126 1.000         
14  Finances /TA (%) 0.462 -0.148 -0.357 1.000        
15  Equity/TA (%) -0.516 -0.313 0.358 0.364 1.000       
16  Dirown (%) 0.166 -0.043 -0.036 0.154 -0.290 1.000      
17  #meetings 0.333 -0.055 -0.045 0.270 -0.197 0.141 1.000     
18  LogZscores 0.401 0.322 -0.452 0.265 -0.375 0.005 0.168 1.000    
19  Logunrestricted  0.411 0.063 -0.385 0.465 -0.471 0.195 0.293 0.405 1.000   
20  Logtotalrestandunrestricted 0.502 0.023 -0.323 0.338 -0.488 0.199 0.299 0.372 0.960 1.000  
21  Logdirrem 0.109 -0.221 0.009 0.012 0.086 -0.383 0.011 -0.117 0.063 0.059 1.000 
ROOA: return on operating assets defined as operating profit divided by average total assets; ROA: return on assets defined as net profit divided by 
average total assets; ROOE: return on operating equity defined as operating profit divided by average total equity; ROE: return on equity defined as net 
profit divided by average total equity; Female: proportion of female directors on board of directors; INEDs: proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on board of directors; LogBsize: logarithm of total number of directors on the board of directors; LogSSBsize: logarithm of total number of 
directors on the Shari’ah Supervisory board; Dirown: percentage of shares owned by directors on the board of directors; # meetings: number of 
board of directors’ meetings; Logdirrem: logarithm of directors compensation;  Logage: logarithm of company age since its establishment year; LogTA: 
logarithm of total assets; Cash/TA: ratio of cash divided by total assets; Overhead ratio: ratio of overheads to total assets ; Finances/TA: ratio of  total 
finances/total assets; Equity/TA: ratio of total equity to total assets; Logzscores: logarithm of Z scores calculated as ROA + capital to asset ra tio 
divided by standard deviation of ROA; Logunrestricted: logarithm of size (dollar value) of unrestricted Mudaraba contracts; Logrestricted&unrestricted: 
logarithm of size (dollar value) of restricted & unrestricted Mudaraba contracts; LogGDP:  logarithm of Gross Domestic Product; Bold figures indicate 
significance at the 5% level or below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
45 
 
 
 
Table 4: The Influence of Board Structure on Financial Performance in Islamic Banks 
 ROOA ROA ROOE ROE 
LogBsize 
5.044
* 
(2.574) 
4.523
* 
(2.542) 
27.156
*** 
(5.628) 
23.158
*** 
(5.244) 
LogSSBsize 
2.461
*
 
(1.434) 
2.541
* 
(1.527) 
13.305
*** 
(5.111) 
14.519
*** 
(4.377) 
INEDs 
0.362 
(0.924) 
0.356 
(0.987) 
3.621 
(2.754) 
0.875 
(2.553) 
Dirown 
0.028 
(0.025) 
0.035 
(0.024) 
0.131 
(0.169) 
0.251
* 
(0.135) 
# meetings 
-0.035 
(0.028) 
-0.038 
(0.029) 
-0.008 
(0.105) 
-0.005 
(0.083) 
Female 
1.606 
(1.433) 
1.350 
(1.472) 
-0.293 
(10.892) 
-1.986 
(8.086) 
CEO/chair 
-0.909
* 
(0.503) 
-0.987
* 
(0.525) 
-3.234
** 
(1.340) 
-2.507
** 
(1.264) 
LogTA 
-0.031 
(0.387) 
-0.074 
(0.396) 
4.900
*** 
(1.100) 
4.572
*** 
(0.984) 
Overhead ratio 
-0.656
*** 
(0.201) 
-0.585
*** 
(0.196) 
-1.199
*** 
(0.278) 
-1.048
*** 
(0.257) 
Finances/TA 
0.050
*** 
(0.018) 
0.049
*** 
(0.018) 
0.102
*** 
(0.034) 
0.090
*** 
(0.032) 
Equity/TA 
0.072
*** 
(0.023) 
0.065
*** 
(0.024) 
0.103
*** 
(0.039) 
0.114
*** 
(0.037) 
LogZscores 
0.461 
(0.771) 
0.444 
(0.776) 
5.261
** 
(2.165) 
5.065
** 
(2.143) 
LogGDP 
-0.087 
(0.131) 
-0.057 
(0.118) 
-0.934 
(0.751) 
-0.597 
(0.576) 
Disclosure Index 
-0.517 
(1.618) 
-0.545 
(1.616) 
10.640
* 
(5.964) 
12.180
** 
(5.054) 
Enforcement Index 
0.770 
(4.445) 
0.900 
(4.339) 
24.084 
(19.259) 
31.300
** 
(15.893) 
Intercept 
-2.741 
(4.249) 
-4.526 
(3.711) 
-6.620 
(7.367) 
-8.610
 
(9.449) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-sq 0.325 0.300 0.549 0.497 
F-stat (p.value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
# obs 634 634 634 634 
ROOA: return on operating assets defined as operating profit divided by average total assets; ROA: return on 
assets defined as net profit divided by average total assets; ROOE: return on operating equity defined as 
operating profit divided by average total equity; ROE: return on equity defined as net profit divided by average 
total equity; Female: proportion of female directors on board of directors; INEDs: proportion of independent 
non-executive directors on board of directors; LogBsize: logarithm of total number of directors on the board of 
directors; LogSSBsize: logarithm of total number of directors on the Shari’ah Supervisory board;  CEO/Chair: 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 where the roles of the CEO and Chairman is split and 0 otherwise; 
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Dirown: percentage of shares owned by directors on the board of directors; # meetings: number of board of 
directors’ meetings; LogTA: logarithm of total assets; Overhead ratio: ratio of overheads to total assets; 
Finances/TA: ratio of  total finances/total assets; Equity/TA: ratio of total equity to total assets; LogZscores: 
logarithm of Z scores calculated as ROA + capital to asset ratio divided by standard deviation of ROA; 
LogGDP: logarithm of Gross Domestic Product; Disclosure and Enforcement Indexes: sum of dummy 
variables take the value of 1 if the answer to questions on disclosure and enforcement from the Bank 
Regulation and Supervision Survey, carried out by the World Bank, is yes and 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * 
indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust and clustered standard errors are 
reported in the parentheses.  
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Table 5: The Non-Linear Relationship between SSB Size and Financial Performance in 
Islamic Banks 
 ROOA ROA ROOE ROE 
Bsize 
0.378 
(0.320) 
0.327 
(0.315) 
2.065
** 
(0.896) 
1.703
** 
(0.759) 
Bsizesq 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.045 
(0.044) 
-0.036 
(0.034) 
SSBsize 
0.641
* 
(0.342) 
0.637
* 
(0.340) 
4.056
*** 
(1.219) 
4.537
*** 
(0.977) 
SSBsq 
-0.038
* 
(0.020) 
-0.037
* 
(0.020) 
-0.268
*** 
(0.093) 
-0.299
*** 
(0.070) 
INEDs 
0.250 
(0.941) 
0.252 
(1.003) 
2.811 
(2.783) 
0.029 
(2.562) 
Dirown 
0.020 
(0.025) 
0.028 
(0.025) 
0.063 
(0.176) 
0.178 
(0.135) 
# meetings 
-0.036 
(0.028) 
-0.039 
(0.029) 
-0.021 
(0.108) 
-0.022 
(0.085) 
Female 
1.819 
(1.398) 
1.542 
(1.428) 
1.004 
(11.215) 
-0.892 
(8.272) 
CEO/chair 
-0.904
* 
(0.503) 
-0.983
* 
(0.525) 
-3.184
** 
(1.344) 
-2.475
* 
(1.265) 
LogTA 
-0.017 
(0.391) 
-0.065 
(0.401) 
5.123
*** 
(1.131) 
4.810
*** 
(1.009) 
Overhead ratio 
-0.659
*** 
(0.202) 
-0.587
*** 
(0.197) 
-1.208
*** 
(0.283) 
-1.060
*** 
(0.261) 
Finances/TA 
0.050
*** 
(0.018) 
0.048
*** 
(0.018) 
0.101
*** 
(0.034) 
0.090
*** 
(0.032) 
Equity/TA 
0.073
*** 
(0.024) 
0.066
*** 
(0.024) 
0.110
*** 
(0.039) 
0.122
*** 
(0.037) 
LogZscores 
0.465 
(0.775) 
0.450 
(0.780) 
5.284
** 
(2.187) 
5.112
** 
(2.169) 
LogGDP 
-0.085 
(0.131) 
-0.054 
(0.119) 
-0.906 
(0.735) 
-0.570 
(0.561) 
Disclosure Index 
-0.366 
(1.625) 
-0.421 
(1.620) 
11.841
** 
(6.007) 
13.045
** 
(5.099) 
Enforcement Index 
1.133 
(4.521) 
1.194 
(4.417) 
27.380 
(19.186) 
33.944
** 
(15.887) 
Intercept 
-11.304 
(11.007) 
-11.330 
(14.440) 
-7.344
 
(6.928) 
-9.884
 
(9.336) 
Optimum SSB size 8.4 8.6 7.5 7.6 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-sq 0.325 0.301 0.551 0.503 
F-stat.  (p.value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
# obs 634 634 634 634 
ROOA: return on operating assets defined as operating profit divided by average total assets; ROA: return on 
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assets defined as net profit divided by average total assets; ROOE: return on operating equity defined as 
operating profit divided by average total equity; ROE: return on equity defined as net profit divided by average 
total equity; Female: proportion of female directors on board of directors; INEDs: proportion of independent 
non-executive directors on board of directors; Bsize: total number of directors on the board of directors; 
Bsizesq: quadratic term of the  total number of directors on the board of directors; SSBsize: total number of 
directors on the Shari’ah Supervisory board; SSBsizesq: quadratic term of the  total number of directors on the 
Shari’ah Supervisory board; CEO/Chair: dummy variable takes the value of 1 where the roles of the CEO and 
Chairman is split and 0 otherwise; Dirown: percentage of shares owned by directors on the board of directors; 
# meetings: number of board of directors’ meetings; LogTA: logarithm of total assets; Overhead ratio: ratio of 
overheads to total assets; Finances/TA: ratio of  total finances/total assets; Equity/TA: ratio of total equity to 
total assets; LogZscores: logarithm of Z scores calculated as ROA + capital to asset ratio divided by standard 
deviation of ROA; LogGDP: logarithm of Gross Domestic Product; Disclosure and Enforcement Indexes: sum 
of dummy variables take the value of 1 if the answer to questions on disclosure and enforcement from the 
Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, carried out by the World Bank, is yes and 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * 
indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust and clustered standard errors are 
reported in the parentheses.  
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Table 6: GMM Estimation for the Influence of Board Structure on Financial Performance 
in Islamic Banks 
 
 ROOA ROA ROOE ROE 
L.ROOA  0.289
*** 
(0.015) 
   
L.ROA   0.281
*** 
(0.015) 
  
L.ROOE    0.392
*** 
(0.034) 
 
L.ROE     0.257
*** 
(0.040) 
LogBsize 5.416
*** 
(1.498) 
3.555
*** 
(1.059) 
14.638
** 
(6.309) 
26.447
*** 
(7.314) 
LogSSBsize 2.967
** 
(1.243) 
2.944
** 
(1.401) 
13.861
*** 
(4.476) 
11.886
** 
(5.477) 
INEDs 1.129 
(1.133) 
0.588 
(1.027) 
2.043 
(3.611) 
1.463 
(3.391) 
Dirown 0.163
** 
(0.083) 
0.032 
(0.090) 
-0.226 
(0.315) 
-0.230 
(0.251) 
# meetings -0.044 
(0.031) 
-0.068
*** 
(0.023) 
-0.376
** 
(0.177) 
-0.225
* 
(0.116) 
Female 1.057 
(3.156) 
4.513 
(3.548) 
0.199 
(21.909) 
-23.248 
(16.624) 
CEO/chair -1.284
*** 
(0.342) 
-0.019 
(0.551) 
-0.973 
(1.082) 
-1.446 
(1.304) 
LogTA 0.031 
(0.294) 
0.446 
(0.453) 
3.493
*** 
(1.197) 
3.567
*** 
(1.310) 
Overhead ratio -0.669
*** 
(0.035) 
-0.656
*** 
(0.097) 
-1.053
*** 
(0.154) 
-1.108
*** 
(0.139) 
Finances /TA 0.043
*** 
(0.008) 
0.035
*** 
(0.007) 
0.125
*** 
(0.032) 
0.104
*** 
(0.026) 
Equity/TA 0.078
*** 
(0.008) 
0.060
*** 
(0.013) 
0.148
** 
(0.067) 
0.155
*** 
(0.056) 
LogZscores 0.842 
(0.479) 
0.217 
(0.174) 
2.495 
(1.915) 
5.592
***
 
(2.081) 
LogGDP -0.509 
(0.412) 
-0.097 
(0.424) 
-3.541 
(3.922) 
-7.632
*
 
(3.925) 
Disclosure Index 1.472 
(1.879) 
-0.692 
(1.653) 
1.571 
(7.099) 
-10.954 
(8.035) 
Enforcement Index -1.945 
(2.191) 
0.880 
(1.890) 
-4.955 
(7.071) 
-7.848
 
(7.816) 
# Obs 555 491 554 554 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F stat.    (p.value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 0.048 0.051 0.000 0.000 
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p.value 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)     
p.value 
0.470 0.306 0.586 0.616 
Hansen test  p.value 0.989 0.991 0.998 0.998 
L.ROOA: lagged return on operating assets defined as operating profit divided by average total assets; 
L.ROA: lagged return on assets defined as net profit divided by average total assets; L.ROOE: lagged return 
on operating equity defined as operating profit divided by average total equity; L.ROE: lagged return on 
equity defined as net profit divided by average total equity; Female: proportion of female directors on board 
of directors; INEDs: proportion of independent non-executive directors on board of directors; LogBsize: 
logarithm of total number of directors on the board of directors; LogSSBsize: logarithm of total number of 
directors on the Shari’ah Supervisory board;  CEO/Chair: dummy variable takes the value of 1 where the 
roles of the CEO and Chairman is split and 0 otherwise; Dirown: percentage of shares owned by directors on 
the board of directors; # meetings: number of board of directors’ meetings; LogTA: logarithm of total assets; 
Overhead ratio: ratio of overheads to total assets Finances/TA: ratio of  total finances/total assets; Equity/TA: 
ratio of total equity to total assets; LogZscores: logarithm of Z scores calculated as ROA + capital to asset 
ratio divided by standard deviation of ROA; LogGDP: logarithm of Gross Domestic Product; Disclosure and 
Enforcement Indexes: sum of dummy variables take the value of 1 if the answer to questions on disclosure 
and enforcement from the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, carried out by the World Bank, is yes 
and 0 otherwise;. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust and 
clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses.  
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Table 7: Instrumental Variables Regressions using 2SLS 
 
 First Stage Second Stage 
 LogSSBsize ROOA ROA 
L.LogSSBsize 
0.675
*** 
(0.041) 
  
LogBsize 
0.133
*** 
(0.040) 
2.958
* 
(1.756) 
3.129
* 
(1.755) 
LogSSBsizeFitted value 
 6.331
*** 
(2.208) 
6.373
*** 
(2.219) 
INEDs 
0.034 
(0.022) 
1.450 
(0.968) 
1.599 
(1.004) 
Dirown 
-0.002
** 
(0.001) 
0.046 
(0.032) 
0.052
* 
(0.031) 
# meetings 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.085
** 
(0.034) 
-0.085
** 
(0.034) 
Female 
0.157 
(0.101) 
-0.880 
(1.966) 
-1.813 
(2.046) 
CEO/chair 
0.011 
(0.012) 
-1.644
*** 
(0.550) 
-1.678
*** 
(0.566) 
LogTA 
-0.0004 
(0.008) 
-0.798
** 
(0.397) 
-0.911
** 
(0.405) 
Overhead ratio 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.818
*** 
(0.148) 
-0.802
*** 
(0.151) 
Finances/TA 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.078
*** 
(0.022) 
0.076
*** 
(0.023) 
Equity/TA 
-0.005
** 
(0.002) 
0.078
*** 
(0.025) 
0.075
*** 
(0.025) 
LogZscores 
0.001 
(0.011) 
1.425
* 
(0.848) 
1.384 
(0.848) 
LogGDP 
0.037
* 
(0.019) 
-0.822 
(0.541) 
-0.655 
(0.528) 
Disclosure Index 
0.144
*** 
(0.052) 
-3.484
* 
(2.026) 
-3.810
* 
(2.026) 
Enforcement Index 
0.853
** 
(0.379) 
-15.725 
(10.738) 
-14.278 
(10.521) 
Intercept 
-19.016
** 
(7.954) 
27.727 
(21.118) 
24.350 
(22.085) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-sq 0.847 0.511 0.488 
F-stat (p.value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
# obs 394 394 394 
Hausman Test (p value) 0.036   
ROOA: return on operating assets defined as operating profit divided by average total assets; ROA: return on 
assets defined as net profit divided by average total assets; Female: proportion of female directors on board of 
directors; INEDs: proportion of independent non-executive directors on board of directors; LogBsize: 
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logarithm of total number of directors on the board of directors; LogSSBsize: logarithm of total number of 
directors on the Shari’ah Supervisory board;  L.LogSSBsize: 3 lags of the logarithm of total number of 
directors on the Shari’ah Supervisory board; LogSSBsizeFitted value; fitted values of the logarithm of SSB 
size; CEO/Chair: dummy variable takes the value of 1 where the roles of the CEO and Chairman is split and 0 
otherwise; Dirown: percentage of shares owned by directors on the board of directors; # meetings: number of 
board of directors’ meetings; LogTA: logarithm of total assets; Overhead ratio: ratio of overheads to total 
assets; Finances/TA: ratio of  total finances/total assets; Equity/TA: ratio of total equity to total assets; 
LogZscores: logarithm of Z scores calculated as ROA + capital to asset ratio divided by standard deviation of 
ROA; LogGDP: logarithm of Gross Domestic Product;Disclosure and Enforcement Indexes: sum of dummy 
variables take the value of 1 if the answer to questions on disclosure and enforcement from the Bank 
Regulation and Supervision Survey, carried out by the World Bank, is yes and 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * 
indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust and clustered standard errors are 
reported in the parentheses.  
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Table 8: The Determinants of Board Size and Shari’ah Supervisory Board Size 
 Panel A  Panel B  
 Bsize Bsize Bsize SSBsize SSBsize SSBsize 
LogTA 
0.042
***
 
(0.008) 
 
0.035
***
 
(0.008) 
0.025
***
 
(0.008) 
 
0.019
**
 
(0.008) 
Logage  
0.058
***
 
(0.012) 
0.037
***
 
(0.013) 
 
0.042
***
 
(0.015) 
0.032
**
 
(0.016) 
L.ROOA 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
L.INEDs 
-0.075
***
 
(0.020) 
-0.041
**
 
(0.020) 
-0.063
***
 
(0.020) 
0.039
*
 
(0.021) 
0.061
**
 
(0.024) 
0.047
**
 
(0.023) 
L.LogBsize   
 0.301
***
 
(0.053) 
0.309
***
 
(0.049) 
0.282
***
 
(0.052) 
Dirown 
0.0002 
(0.001) 
0.0001 
(0.001) 
0.0001 
(0.001) 
-0.003
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.002
**
 
(0.001) 
-0.002
**
 
(0.001) 
Finances/TA 
-0.001
***
 
(0.0003) 
-0.001
***
 
(0.0003) 
-0.001
***
 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
Logzscores 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.016
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.012
**
 
(0.005) 
-0.014
***
 
(0.005) 
Cash/TA 
0.002
***
 
(0.0005) 
0.002
***
 
(0.0005) 
0.002
***
 
(0.0005) 
-0.001
**
 
(0.0005) 
-0.001
**
 
(0.0005) 
-0.001
**
 
(0.0005) 
Disclosure Index 0.348
***
 
(0.045) 
0.240
***
 
(0.026) 
0.329
***
 
(0.043) 
0.174
***
 
(0.045) 
0.109
***
 
(0.032) 
0.164
***
 
(0.042) 
Enforcement Index 0.811
***
 
(0.101) 
0.549
***
 
(0.061) 
0.764
***
 
(0.098) 
0.356
***
 
(0.111) 
0.197
**
 
(0.082) 
0.329
***
 
(0.105) 
Intercept -21.757
***
 
(2.866) 
-14.502
***
 
(1.660) 
-20.488
***
 
(2.772) 
-10.120
***
 
(2.984) 
-5.742
***
 
(2.168) 
-9.387
***
 
(2.842) 
R-sq 0.658 0.646 0.664 0.635 0.635 0.639 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stat    (p.value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
# Obs 569 569 569 569 569 569 
Bsize: total number of directors on the board of directors; SSBsize: total number of directors on the Shari’ah 
Supervisory board; L.LogBsize: lagged logarithm of board of directors’ size; LogTA: logarithm of total assets; Logage: 
logarithm of company age since its establishment year; L.ROOA: lagged return on operating assets defined as operating 
profit divided by average total assets; Dirown: percentage of shares owned by directors on the board of directors; 
Finances/TA: ratio of  total finances/total assets; LogZscores: logarithm of Z scores calculated as ROA + capital to asset 
ratio divided by standard deviation of ROA; Cash/TA: ratio of cash divided by total assets; L.INEDs: lagged proportion 
of independent non-executive directors on board of directors; Disclosure and Enforcement Indexes: sum of dummy 
variables take the value of 1 if the answer to questions on disclosure and enforcement from the Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey, carried out by the World Bank, is yes and 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust and clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses.  
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Table 9: Agency Relationships in Islamic Banks 
 
 Panel A (FE) Panel B (GMM) 
 Cash/TA Cash/TA Cash/TA Cash/TA 
L.Cash/TA   0 .546*** 
(0.031) 
0.602
***
 
(0.031) 
LogBsize 21.448
***
 
(6.739) 
22.082
***
 
(6.785) 
-0.900 
(4.560) 
-4.160 
(6.022) 
INEDs -0.009 
(2.686) 
-0.064 
(2.678) 
-0.311 
(4.021) 
-2.143 
(3.608) 
LogSSBsize -8.422
**
 
(4.110) 
-8.092
**
 
(4.105) 
-4.557 
(7.303) 
-2.217 
(7.132) 
LogTA 0.935 
(1.971) 
-0.986 
(2.054) 
 -3.474* 
(1.863) 
-1.396 
(1.681) 
Logage 0.626 
(1.862) 
0.726 
(1.845) 
0.672 
(2.321) 
-.5133 
(2.244) 
Finances/TA -0.255
***
 
(0.056) 
-0.245
***
 
(0.054) 
-0.137
***
 
(0.033) 
-0.126
***
 
(0.045) 
Logzscores 0.815 
(0.767) 
0.790 
(0.759) 
1.118
**
 
(0.570) 
0.989
*
 
(0.599) 
Dirown -0.108
*
 
(0.063) 
-0.109
*
 
(0.063) 
0 .012 
(0.193) 
-0.180 
(0.276) 
ROOA -0.334
**
 
(0.143) 
-0.341
**
 
(0.137) 
0.081 
(0.172) 
0.074 
(0.182) 
Logunrestricted 1.612
**
 
(0.712) 
 2.452
***
 
(0.614) 
 
Logrestricted&unrestricted  1.686
**
 
(0.812) 
 2.387
***
 
(0.811) 
Logdirrem -5.488
***
 
(1.897) 
-5.726
***
 
(1.918) 
-4.252
*
 
(2.183) 
-4.270
*
 
(2.262) 
Intercept 5.086 
(8.111) 
3.864 
(8.088) 
22.367
*
 
(11.648) 
13.291 
(8.706) 
R-sq 0.498 0.496   
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stat    (p.value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
# Obs 424 424 384 384 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 
p.value   0.028 0.032 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 
p.value   0.324 0.231 
Hansen test  p.value   0.997 0.983 
Cash/TA: ratio of cash divided by total assets;  L.Cash/TA: lagged ratio of cash divided by total assets; 
LogBsize: logarithm of total number of directors on the board of directors; INEDs: proportion of independent 
non-executive directors on board of directors; LogSSBsize: logarithm of total number of directors on the 
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Shari’ah Supervisory board; LogTA: logarithm of total assets; Logage: logarithm of company age since its 
establishment year; Finances/TA: ratio of  total finances/total assets; LogZscores: logarithm of Z scores 
calculated as ROA + capital to asset ratio divided by standard deviation of ROA; Dirown: percentage of shares 
owned by directors on the board of directors; ROOA: return on operating assets defined as operating profit 
divided by average total assets; Logunrestricted: logarithm of size (dollar value) of unrestricted Mudaraba 
contracts; Logrestricted&unrestricted: logarithm of size (dollar value) of restricted & unrestricted Mudaraba 
contracts; Logdirrem: logarithm of directors compensation. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. Robust and clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
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Corporate Governance in Islamic Banks: New Insights for Dual 
Board Structure and Agency Relationships   
 
 
   
 
Highlights 
 
 We investigate the unique agency relationships and dual board structure. 
 We use cross country sample over the period 2006-2014. 
 We find evidence of the scope of operation hypothesis. 
 The greater the size of unrestricted contracts the higher the agency costs. 
 The paper has a number of policy implications about the design of governance 
mechanisms and the dynamics of unrestricted contracts. 
 
 
 
 
 
